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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most exciting recent developments in outer space, espe-
cially from a legal standpoint, is the advent of space tourism. Within
the legal issues surrounding that development, liability is of prime
importance.
Liability is, of course, always about "passing the buck," or, more
precisely, about who should pay compensation for damage caused by
the activities concerned. At both the international level and in the
field of space law, however, a large measure of confusion has often
arisen as to the scope, meaning, and consequences of liability. This
confusion is partly the consequence of liability's intricate relationship
to the concept of "[state] responsibility,"1 where Article VI of the Outer
Space Treaty2 has applied this concept to the specific context of outer
space and space activities. Further confusion results from the fact
that liability itself is a concept and a term used in numerous national
as well as international legal regimes, but may have different inter-
pretations and applications in the separate contexts.
Thus, space law liability, especially of the international brand,
which is the core subject of this Article, depends upon a specific legal
regime, the boundaries of which will depend on questions such as:
where does liability apply, who is a potential claimant, who is poten-
tially liable, what type of liability is provided, how will compensation
be distributed, etc.
1. Frans G. von der Dunk, Liability versus Responsibility in Space Law: Misconcep-
tion or Misconstruction?, 1991 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 363, 363-71.
2. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 6, Jan.
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter "Outer Space Treaty"].
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As will be seen, liability issues in this specific field are very much
about "passing the buck" to those daring individuals who are trying to
make space tourism and private spaceflight actually happen-to the
Buck Rogerses of real life.
II. "PRIVATE SPACEFLIGHT" VERSUS "SPACE TOURISM"
A few introductory points should be briefly discussed here concern-
ing the terminology that will be used. While many of these issues
have been brought to the attention of the public essentially under the
heading of "space tourism," the term "private spaceflight" will be used
in this article as the main captive label for the activities under
consideration.
"Space tourism" has been defined as "any commercial activity offer-
ing customers direct or indirect experience with space travel."3 The
"official" definition of tourism offered by the World Tourist Organiza-
tion ("WTO") and the U.N. Statistical Committee in 1994 reads: "The
activities of persons travelling to and staying in places outside their
usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure
... "4 Tourism, hence, requires the availability of three distinct
elements:
(1) a discretionary income available for leisure travel; (2) ample leisure time to
spend on both preparations for and taking the trips themselves; and (3) an
infrastructure supporting tourism that offers accommodations, food and
amenities, transportation systems, and attractions to see and do at the place
visited.5
For one part, the above definition of space tourism encompasses
"indirect experience," which refers to activities such as parabolic
flights for the sake of enjoying a few seconds of weightlessness-con-
sidered the ultimate "space experience." However while these flights
come close to the edge of outer space, they never enter outer space.6
3. Stephan Hobe & Jirgen Cloppenburg, Towards a New Aerospace Convention ?:
Selected Legal Issues of "Space Tourism", 2004 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEv-
ENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 377, at 377; see Steven Freeland,
The Impact of Space Tourism on the International Law of Outer Space, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 178, at 179.
4. Roger D. Launius & Dennis R. Jenkins, Is it Finally Time for Space Tourism?, 4
ASTROPOLITICs 253, 255 (2006). Actually, after "for leisure," the definition of tour-
ism adds "business, and other purposes," but this is a strange, complicated, and
counter-intuitive addition, ultimately to be rejected since it would effectively
equate "tourism" with all travel, which takes away any distinctive, common-
sense meaning of the former phrase. Launius and Jenkins, in their extended his-
torical expose, clearly do not refer to all travel, but merely to travel for purposes
that everyone would agree constitute tourism, properly speaking.
5. Launius & Jenkins, supra note 4, at 254.
6. See John Loizou, Turning space tourism into commercial reality, 22 SPACE POLICY
289, 289 (2006); Lesley Jane Smith & Kay-Uwe Horl, Legal Parameters of Space
Tourism, 2004 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
[Vol. 86:400
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Thus, from most angles indirect experiences such as parabolic flights
do not legally encompass issues of space law.
For the other part, space tourism refers to the reason for private
individuals to undertake the activity: the wish to enjoy space travel is
not altogether a legally-decisive criterion. For instance, "typical" air-
craft will carry both tourists (persons taking a flight because they love
flying or want to spend their holidays away far from home) as well as
passengers who merely need to go to another place for business rea-
sons. Yet, legally speaking, all passengers on such a flight are equal
in terms of aviation law-whether it concerns contractual liability,
consumer rights, or the need to bring a valid passport.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Mr. Will Whitehorn, the
CEO of Virgin Galactic (the company most likely to first start offering
sub-orbital flights to tourists), has stated that the ultimate purpose of
private spaceflight activity is not to undertake tourism, but to demon-
strate the safety of the technology used. 7 This would enable compa-
nies to begin offering flights between various points on earth, where
passengers will be solicited regardless of whether they want to fly that
stretch for fun or for professional reasons.8
It is submitted, therefore, that "private spaceflight" is the more
precise and more helpful term for the purpose of legal analysis. The
level of private participation in these new types of space activities re-
quires analysis and, likely, adaptation of the current legal environ-
ment for undertaking space activities, whether national or
international.
III. SURVEYING THE SCENE: FIVE TYPES OF
PRIVATE SPACEFLIGHT
Having thus outlined the scope of the present article as focusing
essentially on private spaceflight, whether at the service of tourists or
otherwise, upon closer scrutiny, five distinct types of private participa-
tion in spaceflight may be discerned. These five types will each be
slightly more elaborated upon as to their main technical, operational,
and economic characteristics before the specific legal ramifications
and parameters involved in those activities are discussed.
OUTER SPACE 37, at 37; see infra Part VII.B. on the discussion of where outer
space is supposed to begin.
7. See, e.g., Frans G. von der Dunk, Report on the 2006 ECSL Practitioners' Forum,
33 ECSL NEWS 3, 3 (2006).
8. Id. It may be further noted that Virgin Galactic is an off-spring of Virgin Atlan-
tic, a British airline company providing air transportation between various points
on earth.
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A. Orbital Space Tourism
The first type of private spaceflight, chronologically speaking, is
that of "orbital space tourism." Its immediate precursor dates back to
1990, when a Japanese journalist spent a week on the all-Russian
space station Mir, followed the next year by an English engineer.9
These two men, although neither were employees of the Russian
Space Agency, were professionally-trained astronauts and were able
to go to outer space as a spectacular consequence of their own-other-
wise non-astronautic-professional assignments.
Regular space tourism took off only in April 2001, when U.S. citi-
zen Dennis Tito was launched to the Russian part of the International
Space Station ("ISS") for no other reasons than that he desired to fly
in outer space and that he had the money privately available to fulfil
that desire.1o
Originally, Tito-through the brokerage of a small, private com-
pany called MirCorp that was established specifically for bringing
self-financed private persons into space-was supposed to be sent on a
Russian launch vehicle to the Russian space station Mir. At the time,
the overall price tag of Tito's trip was estimated to be approximately
$20,000,000 U.S. In the course of his preparations, however, one inci-
dent too many befell Mir, and the space station had to be de-orbited
over the Pacific Ocean in March 2001.11 In order to honor their con-
tractual commitment, the Russians had but one opportunity: change
Tito's destination to the Russian module of the ISS.
A second millionaire, South African Mark Shuttleworth, followed
suit in 2002; U.S. national Greg Olsen became the third space tourist
in 2005; and Anousheh Ansari became the first female space tourist in
2006.12 At the time of writing, space tourist number five, Charles
Simonyi, is the last on the list, having flown in April 2007,13 but there
are at least a handful more of people gearing up. In the meantime,
MirCorp has been restructured and replaced in its particular role by
9. See Sergei A. Negoda, Legal Aspects of the Commercial Development of the Rus-
sian Segment of the ISS, 28 AIR & SPACE LAW 89, 90-91 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Launius & Jenkins, supra note 4, at 260; Smith & Hrl, supra note 6, at
38.
11. See Linda Billings, Exploration for the masses? Or joyrides for the ultra-rich?
Prospects for space tourism, 22 SPACE POLICY 162, 163 (2006); Rosanna Sattler,
U.S. Commercial Activities aboard the International Space Station, 28 AIR &
SPACE LAW 66, 81 (2003). Notably, Mir had been in operation for fifteen years at
that point-three times its originally expected lifetime.
12. See Leonard David, Space Adventures Sees Wide Range of Public Space Travel,
SPACE NEWS, July 23, 2007, at 12.
13. See David, supra note 12, at 12.
[Vol. 86:400
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Space Adventures with the activities, legally speaking, being relocated
from the Netherlands to the United States.14
B. Sub-orbital Space Tourism
The second type of private spaceflight should be called "sub-orbital
space tourism." The International Civil Aviation Organization
("ICAO") has defined "sub-orbital flight" as "a flight up to a very high
altitude which does not involve sending the vehicle into orbit."15 The
ICAO goes on to reference the definition of "sub-orbital trajectory" by
applicable U.S. law as "the intentional flight path of a launch vehicle,
re-entry vehicle, or any portion thereof, whose vacuum instantaneous
impact point does not leave the surface of the earth."16 These defini-
tions are vague as to the altitude, especially in determining whether
outer space is reached. In contrast, a marginally more precise defini-
tion of "sub-orbital" effectively refers to "the launch of an object or ob-
jects into outer space without that object or such objects completing
one or more orbits around the earth."17
Sub-orbital space tourism was actually triggered by the Ansari X
Prize competition, a prize in the aviation-pioneering-era style for a re-
markable technological or operational feat. The Ansari family (of
whom the first female space tourist is a prominent member), together
with a few others, had offered a purse of $10,000,000 U.S. in 1996 for
the first completely privately funded reusable craft that could fly a
pilot and two (dummy) persons twice within three weeks to an altitude
of over 100 kilometers (claimed to constitute the edge of outer
space). 18
Shortly before the competition deadline, in October 2004, Burt
Rutan's small company, Scaled Composites, achieved the required feat
and won the prize. His SpaceShipOne ("SS-1") vehicle was carried by
a small, almost equally exotic aircraft, the White Knight, to an alti-
tude of 55,000 feet, where SS-1 separated to launch itself towards its
ultimate altitude of 112 kilometers. Re-entry, including a few minutes
of weightlessness, was not in a normal, fully-controlled mode, but
rather was something like a sycamore leaf floating down. Once it was
14. While Sattler still speaks about MirCorp and its role in bringing not only Tito,
but also Shuttleworth, to the ISS and only refers to Space Adventures in a differ-
ent context, all later authors simply refer to Space Adventures as being responsi-
ble for those as well as follow-up trips. Cf. Sattler, supra note 11, at 79-81, 79
n.63 with Billings, supra, note 11, at 163.
15. Peter van Fenema, Suborbital Flights and ICAO, 30 AIR & SPACE LAw 396, 405
(2005).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 396.
18. See, e.g., Gregg Maryniak, When will we see a Golden Age of Spaceflight?, 21
SPACE POLICY 111, 118 (2005); Billings, supra note 11, at 163.
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back at 55,000 feet, the SS-1 finally transformed into a glider, de-
scending pilot-controlled from there. 19
Immediately after the SS-1 was launched, the Virgin Group billion-
aire entrepreneur Sir Richard Branson, who had been competing for
the X Prize, established a company called Virgin Galactic, which in
turn formed a joint venture with Rutan's Scaled Composites. The
joint venture owned the intellectual property rights and licensed the
technology to Virgin Galactic, the majority owner of the joint venture.
Scaled Composites was the minority shareholder. This structure was
chosen in order to avoid monopolizing access to the technology and
foreclosing Virgin Galactic's use of other technology. 20
Virgin Galactic soon announced plans to develop and build a
SpaceShipTwo ("SS-2"), or, more precisely, five SS-2s, each a bigger
version of SS-1 carried by a larger aircraft, using essentially the same
SS-1 technology. By 2008 or 2009, Virgin Galactic is targeting to
launch three flights per day, taking six passengers per spaceship to an
altitude of some 120 kilometers and allowing them about five minutes
of weightlessness, at a ticket price of $200,000 U.S. per person.2 1 Ad-
ditional passengers would be able to witness from the carrier (a Boe-
ing 757-like aircraft) the air-launch proper and the subsequent flight
of the SS-2-obviously at a considerably lower price.2 2 Contacts were
quickly established with the New Mexico spaceport (now dubbed
"Spaceport America") to allow Virgin Galactic's first number of flights
to depart from there.2 3
Following the apparent preliminary success in drawing custom-
ers-at the European Centre for Space Law ("ECSL") March 2006
Practitioners' Forum in Paris, Whitehorn claimed to have some 43,000
bookings, with down-payments adding up to a total of $13 million U.S.
already deposited-Virgin Galactic recently negotiated a similar deal
with the Swedish Space Corporation ("SSC") to turn the northerly
launch site at Kiruna into "Spaceport Sweden," allowing passengers to
experience the Aurora Borealis from the edge of outer space by 2012.24
Other companies also started announcing similar plans. For instance,
Space Adventures is discussing the possibility of establishing space-
19. See, e.g., von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 2; Launius & Jenkins, supra note 4, at
254, 272; Loizou, supra note 6, at 289; Van Fenema, supra note 15, at 396, 405.
20. See Sylvia Ospina, Lessons from "The Little Prince" on Space Flight, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 190, 191;
von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 3.
21. See von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 3; Launius & Jenkins, supra note 4, at 272;
Loizou, supra note 6, at 289; Van Fenema, supra note 15, at 396.
22. See von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 3.
23. See, e.g., Leonard David, Challenges Ahead for Spaceport America, SPACE NEWS,
Oct. 23, 2006, at 4; Billings, supra note 11, at 163.
24. See, e.g., P.B. de Selding & Tariq Malik, Virgin, Swedish Spaceport Sign Deal for
Suborbital Flights, SPACE NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007, at 11.
[Vol. 86:400
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ports for these types of flights in Ras al Khaimah (United Arab Emir-
ates) and Singapore. 2 5
C. Sub-orbital Private Spaceflight
The third type of private spaceflight, where the tag of "space tour-
ism" would no longer convincingly stick, is that of "sub-orbital private
spaceflight." It emanates effectively from the second type of private
spaceflight. As mentioned, the strategic idea behind the envisaged
SS-2 flights was not so much to undertake space tourism, but to prove
technology-and then to draw in required external financing for the
next generation of private spaceflight vehicles. These third genera-
tion SS-3 vehicles are intended to offer flights from one point on earth
to another or from earth to a specific destination in space and back.
Ultimately perhaps, these trips may even include at least one full or-
bit, in which case, the latter type of spaceflight should, of course, be
labeled "orbital private spaceflight."26
This version of private spaceflight, however, would likely take the
longest amount of time to achieve. Moreover, it would essentially
amount to a fourth type of spaceflight, hotels in orbit, which will be
discussed further later. As such, only the two other alternative ver-
sions (though one flight could very well serve both purposes at the
same time) will be discussed here. On the one hand, it is in earth-to-
earth transportation that this type of private spaceflight would come
closest to aviation-transporting passengers and cargo between two
distinct places on earth. On the other hand, it is in earth-to-space and
space-to-earth transportation that this type of private spaceflight
would become more akin to traditional human spaceflight, notably vis-
iting space stations already in orbit.
While, perhaps wisely, no timeline is indicated as of yet for the SS-
3 to be operational, a clue might be garnered from the remarks of
Whitehorn at March 2006's ECSL Practitioners' Forum.2 7 He pro-
fessed that the main aim of SS-2, as a technology demonstrator, was
to achieve a safety goal of accidents happening in no more than one in
50,000 flights. He indicated that such a safety-level would allow the
company to move into sub-orbital spaceflight, as such a risk level is
roughly the level applicable to air transport in the safer parts of the
25. See Launius & Jenkins, supra note 4, at 254, 273; Billings, supra note 11, at 163;
Loizou, supra note 6, at 290 (quoting a ticket price of $102,000 U.S., while indi-
cating passengers will remain strapped to their seats during the whole flight,
missing out on the excitement of true weightlessness).
26. Whitehorn, at the ECSL Practitioners' Forum, Mar. 17, 2006, 33 ECSL News 3, 3
(2006); see L. David, Virgin Galactic Aims High with Commercial Space Flight
Plans, SPACE NEWS, Nov. 20, 2006, at 17.
27. See von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 2-3.
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world.28 He also claimed that Virgin Galactic intended to offer three
flights a day. Based on those assumptions, and presuming that Virgin
Galactic would actually start with SS-2 flights sometime in 2008, the
50,000 flight-threshold would be reached by 2050 or so at the earliest.
Even presuming a massive and rapid increase of flights to twenty
flights per day-requiring perhaps as many as twenty-five vehicles
being operational at any time-this threshold would only be reached
in approximately seven years. 29
Because of its close relationship to the second type of "sub-orbital
tourism" and its inherent characteristics, sub-orbital private spacef-
light is going to be treated prior to the fourth type.
D. Hotels in Orbit
The fourth category of spaceflight to be addressed by this Article is
that of "hotels in orbit." As early as 1967, in the slipstream of the
Apollo project reaching out to the Moon, the Hilton hotel chain pro-
fessed an interest in developing proposals to launch and operate ho-
tels in orbit, or even on the Moon. 30 More proposals have been tabled
from time to time, although none of them went very far on the road to
realization.3 1
Most recently, however, driven partly by the X Prize competition
and its successful conclusion in 2004, Bigelow Aerospace has devel-
oped a serious project aiming to have a fully-equipped orbital hotel
operational by 2015. The first major step, the launch of an inflatable
unmanned module Genesis-I, already took place in July 2006 and is
apparently such a success that the next step, sending up Genesis-II, a
copy of Genesis-I carrying mementos for the public, took place ahead
28. This figure should not be taken for granted, however; cf. e.g. Launius & Jenkins,
supra note 4, at 268.
29. This is not meant to be a marketing study, but it is to be kept in mind that the
SS-2 vehicles each should carry (a maximum of) six passengers on board. As ob-
served, in March 2007 Whitehorn claimed 43,000 bookings, and the number has
no doubt risen considerably since. At the same time, with an average five passen-
gers per flight presumed, 50,000 flights still means 250,000 passengers willing to
pay between $50,000 U.S. (the price for a ticket Whitehorn estimated to be appli-
cable towards the end of the 50,000-flight target period) and $200,000 U.S. (the
estimated price over the next few decades, or in the case of twenty flights per day
the next seven or eight years). That seems to be a fairly ambitious target, espe-
cially taking into consideration that other companies will likely enter the busi-
ness as well. It may also be noted that existing studies estimate there will be
some 1,000 clients for sub-orbital private spaceflight in about five years from
now. Loizou, supra note 6, at 289. For a relatively early market overview, see
Patrick Collins, Meeting the Needs of the New Millennium: Passenger Space
Travel and World Economic Growth, 18 SPACE POLICY 183, 183-97 (2002).
30. See Billings, supra note 11, at 162; Launius & Jenkins, supra note 4, at 261.
31. See, e.g., Billings, supra note 11, at 163 (concerning Spacehab in 1999).
[Vol. 86:400
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of the original planning in June 2007.32 The third step would then be
to launch a mock-up version of the ultimate hotel, called Sundancer,
by 2012.33
Following the lead of the X Prize, in order to enhance the possibili-
ties for actually achieving the orbital hotel-to-be, Bigelow Aerospace
dedicated a prize of $50,000,000 U.S. for the first fully privately-
funded orbital space vehicle. 3 4
E. Private Flights to the Moon
For completeness' sake, a fifth possible type of private spaceflight
may be mentioned: the one which will have the Moon for a target. Pri-
vate flights to the moon, however, do not seem to be imminently feasi-
ble. The challenges of getting to the Moon are daunting enough for
the space agency that has been able to bring twelve men out there and
back, the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Agency ("NASA"). To
expect a private effort at manned spaceflight in that direction,
whether for tourist purposes or otherwise, within the next few de-
cades, might be somewhat unrealistic.
Moreover, flights to the Moon entail an additional set of legal, po-
litical, and commercial issues. These challenges relate, among other
things, to the absence of immovable property rights on celestial bodies
such as the Moon 35 and to the existence of and widespread lack of
adherence to36 a special international treaty relevant to the special
status of the Moon and other celestial bodies, the Moon Agreement. 3 7
32. Leonard David & Tariq Malik, Bigelow Successfully Launches Second Module
into Orbit, SPACE NEWS, July 2, 2007, at 5. See, e.g., Leonard David, Genesis 1
Success Advances Bigelow's Planning, SPACE NEWS, Nov. 27, 2006, at 4; Bigelow
Launches Its First Inflatable Module, SPACE NEWS, July 17, 2006, at 3; Leonard
David, FAA Issues license for Bigelow Space Modules, SPACE NEWS, Nov. 29,
2004, at 16; CNN.com, Spacecraft carrying commercial space station launches,
Science & Space, July 12, 2006. Bigelow took his first steps to obtain a license
already in 2001. Sattler, supra note 11, at 68 n. 13.
33. See, e.g., Bigelow Plans to Launch Human-Rated Space Habitat by 2010, SPACE
NEWS, Sept. 25, 2006, at 6; CNN.com, Spacecraft carrying commercial space sta-
tion launches, Science & Space, July 12, 2006.
34. For more information see in particular Bigelow Aerospace, America's Space
Prize, http://www.bigelowaerospace.com/multiverse/space-prize.php (last visited
July 8, 2007); Ospina, supra note 20, at 191.
35. See, e.g., Patricia M. Sterns & Leslie I. Tennen, Private Enterprise and the Re-
sources of Outer Space, 2005 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 240, 241-52; Frans G. von der Dunk, E. Back-Impal-
lomeni, S. Hobe & R.M. Ramirez de Arellano, Surreal estate: addressing the issue
of'Immovable Property Rights on the Moon', 20 SPACE POLICY 149, 149-56 (2004).
36. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY WORKSHOP ON POLICY AND LAW
RELATING TO OUTER SPACE RESOURCES: THE EXAMPLE OF THE MOON, MARS &
OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 17-23 (2006).
37. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.
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For those reasons, private flights to the moon may be safely left out of
the discussion for the time being.
IV. THE LIABILITY CONVENTION
When liability in terms of space activities is to be addressed, the
point of departure should always be the Liability Convention.38
Though to different extents both de jure and de facto, the Liability
Convention will apply to all four types of private spaceflight to be dis-
cussed. Hence, it is helpful to first look at the Liability Convention as
it stands and to outline its major purposes, elements, and clauses.
A. The System of State Liability under the Liability
Convention
Most importantly, the Liability Convention is effectively an elabo-
ration of Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty39 and is based on the
(rather unique) premise of state liability. 40 As a consequence of this
Article and the Liability Convention itself, a state is internationally
liable for any damage caused by a space object, regardless of whether
it may be owned, operated, launched, or paid for even by a private
entity, as long as that state qualifies as "launching state" of the space
object concerned. Such a definition is formally provided by the Liabil-
ity Convention as follows: "The term 'launching State' means: (i) A
State which launches or procures the launching of a space object; (ii) A
State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched."41
While this definition seemingly leads to a clear picture of which states
are liable, once it comes to the allocation of liability in the context of
38. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter "Liability Convention"].
39. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII reads in full: "Each State Party to the
Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose
territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to
another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such
object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, includ-
ing the Moon and other celestial bodies."
40. The major other examples of treaties specifically imposing state liability, also in
cases of essentially private activities, concern a handful of international agree-
ments on dealing with nuclear and oil pollution, such as the Convention on Third
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251;
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, Brussels, done 25 July
1962, not yet entered into force; 57 A.J.I.L. 268 (1963); Vienna Convention on
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265; Interna-
tional Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973
U.N.T.S. 3; and International Convention on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110
U.N.T.S. 57.
41. Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. I(c).
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private involvement, the issue, upon closer examination, is not so
simple.
If Article I(c) of the Liability Convention provides that the first way
in which a state can be qualified as a "launching state" will be when
the state "launches" the space object concerned, what if a private
launch operator is undertaking the launch? Does this make the state
of nationality or registration of the private launch operator liable
under this criterion, or is there no state which can be held liable under
this criterion, since no state "launches" in the proper sense of the
word?
Similar uncertainties apply with respect to the second criterion,
that of a state "that procures the launching," and the third criterion,
that of a state "whose facility" is used for the launch. What if the
launch customer is a private company, for example a satellite commu-
nications company, or if the spaceport from which the launch occurs is
owned and operated by a private company, as is currently the case in a
handful instances within the United States?
The one criterion so far not discussed concerns the state "whose
territory" is used for the launch. Having "territory" in the interna-
tional legal sense of the word is something exclusively reserved for
states. Though of a different nature, an important question arises
here as well-what if the launching takes place outside the territory
of any state, as has now repeatedly occurred with launches conducted
by the private consortium Sea Launch from its launch platform that is
towed out to the high seas prior to launch?4 2 Suffice it to say for the
purpose of the present analysis, that no private spaceflight is likely to
be conducted from the high seas for the time to come, but this may
change.
Ultimately, the state liability which arises under the Liability Con-
vention, to some extent regardless of its precise allocation in the case
of private operators as discussed above, leads concerned states to exer-
cise their national jurisdiction to control private spaceflight in an ef-
fort to guard against liability and any obligation to pay for the damage
caused.
42. It should be reiterated that the high seas fundamentally fall outside the territo-
rial jurisdiction of any state; cf Convention on the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29,
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312; 450 U.N.T.S. 82, with United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea art. 87, 89, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 1835 U.N.T.S. 26. See
also Armel Kerrest, The Launch of Spacecraft from the Sea, in OUTLOOK ON SPACE
LAW OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS 217, 225-33 (Gabriel Lafferranderie & Dapn6
Crowther eds., 1997); Armel Kerrest, Launching Spacecraft from the Sea and the
Outer Space Treaty: The Sea Launch Project, 1997 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, 264, 265-68; H.L. van Traa-Engel-
man, Commercial Utilization of Outer Space (1993), 45-46 (arguing that "facility"
as a criterion for liability for the purpose of the Liability Convention amounts to
quasi-territoriality).
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B. The Main Elements of the Liability Convention's Regime
The Liability Convention, though not referring anywhere explicitly
to the concept, only deals with third-party liability.43 Most clearly,
this third-party liability arises from clauses referring to cases involv-
ing more than one state in the causation of damage, where only the
inter-party distribution of third-party liability was referred to, which
depending upon the case was then explicitly or implicitly left for those
states to address.44 Finally, Article VII of the Liability Convention
excludes "foreign nationals ... participating in the launch" from the
scope of the Convention in case they suffer damage caused by the
space object launched.45
Next, the Liability Convention only deals with third-party liability
to the extent it is international in character. Article VII specifically
excludes claims against a launching state relating to damage suffered
by nationals of that launching state;4 6 any such claims are considered
a matter of relevant national law and not to require any measure of
international "harmonization" or treaty-obligations resting upon the
state(s) concerned.
Two types of liability are then applied by the Convention. On the
one hand, when it comes to damage caused on earth or to aircraft in
flight, absolute liability applies-that is, the mere establishment of
the causal link between the damage and the space object and the iden-
tification of the launching state(s) of the latter suffices for liability to
arise.4 7 Only where the victims have somehow substantially "contrib-
uted" to the occurrence of their own damage, for example by ignoring
warnings that a satellite might re-enter into a certain airspace and
not keeping aircraft out of the area, could the absolute character of the
liability be taken away.48
On the other hand, when it comes to damage caused to other space
objects in outer space, fault liability applies. 4 9 This already raises, at
least in theory, the question of where outer space begins; this issue is
43. See, e.g., Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. III (referring to damage done to
the space object of another state).
44. See Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. V(2).
45. Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. VII; see, e.g., Hobe & Cloppenburg,
supra note 3, at 380.
46. Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. VII.
47. See Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. II; see also Liability Convention,
supra note 38, art. IV(1)(a) (applying absolute liability also in cases where two or
more launching states are jointly causing damage on earth).
48. See Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. VI(1) (speaking of"gross negligence
or ... an act or omission done with intent to cause damage").
49. See Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. III; see also Liability Convention,
supra note 38, art. IV(1)(b) (applying fault liability also in cases where two or
more launching states are jointly causing damage to a third-party space object).
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touched upon below in somewhat greater detail.50 Whether absolute
or fault liability applies, the Liability Convention does not provide any
limit to the compensation due.5 1
Other important provisions of the Liability Convention are worthy
of brief mention here. First, the dispute settlement system will result
in a binding solution only if both parties have agreed in advance.5 2
International claims under the Liability Convention neither require
the exhaustion of local remedies nor stand in the way of private claims
in the court of a launching state. 5 3 Finally, private parties do not
have a claim under the Liability Convention-only specific categories
of state claimants may bring a claim.54
The Liability Convention, drafted in 1972, as of January 1, 2006, is
in force for eighty-three states and three intergovernmental organiza-
tions, 5 5 with twenty-five states acting as signatories.56
V. LIABILITY ISSUES IN ORBITAL SPACE TOURISM
The new phenomenon of orbital space tourism, as it kicked off with
Tito's flight to the International Space Station, generated a number of
new legal and specific liability issues, limited in scope as they might
have seemed. While these issues were still about public spacecraft-
both the spacecraft flying to the ISS, which were Russian Soyuz vehi-
cles launched from Bajkonur, Kazakhstan, and the ISS itself-they
also regarded private persons orbiting as tourists instead of profes-
50. See infra, Part VII.B.
51. Cf. Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. XII, which provides in full:
The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay for
damage under this Convention shall be determined in accordance with
international law and the principles of justice and equity, in order to
provide such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the per-
son, natural or juridical, State or international organization on whose
behalf the claim is presented to the condition which would have existed
if the damage had not occurred.
52. See Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. XIX(2); see generally Liability Con-
vention, supra note 38, arts. XIV-XX.
53. Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. XI(1).
54. Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. VII (giving primary rights of claim to the
state whose nationals have suffered damage, a secondary right to the state whose
permanent residents suffered the damage, and a tertiary right for the state on
whose territory the damage was sustained and explaining that private parties
have no right of recourse under the Liability Convention); see Freeland, supra
note 3, at 183.
55. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Convention on International Lia-
bility for Damage Caused by Space Objects (2006), http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/
SpaceLaw/liability.html. All the important space-faring nations are included
among the parties to the Liability Convention.
56. In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18(a), May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, signature by a state of a treaty brings with it a
fundamental duty not to defeat object and purpose of the treaty prior to its ratifi-
cation by that state.
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sionals working in space. There also was a limited (but crucial) role
for a private "broker:" MirCorp, now known as Space Adventures.57
A. The Liability Convention and Orbital Space Tourism
Looking at the Liability Convention first, it is immediately clear
how a state's liability is affected by the novel development of private
spaceflights. Through the definition of the "launching state," in Arti-
cle I(c) of the Liability Convention, the need arises for the licensing of
any private operators whose actions might make the state liable on
the international plane. Such licensing should specifically provide for
relevant reimbursement obligations-to the extent the state is not
willing to carry that burden itself.
Of course, this is why Russia, the state that launched the Soyuz
that sent Tito to the space station from the Russian facility Bajkonur,
took it upon itself to take out insurance in the case of Dennis Tito
(costing $ 100,000 U.S.),58 since it could neither impose after the fact
such an obligation upon MirCorp/Space Adventures, nor upon Tito.
Had Russia been aware in advance, however, it could well have imple-
mented a plan that would have required either the company or the
tourist to reimburse the state through a license or even contractual
agreements with the Russian Space Agency. 5 9 In future cases, this
certainly remains a possibility-and obviously not only for Russia.
B. The ISS Legal Framework and Orbital Space Tourism
As for international inter-party liability, one has to look to the le-
gal framework underpinning the ISS, which is also a state-to-state af-
fair, as the ISS has been a multiple-state undertaking from the
beginning. For the purpose of the ISS, the United States, Canada,
Japan, and eleven member states of the European Space Agency
("ESA")60 had concluded an international treaty in 1988,61 which was
57. See Smith & Horl, supra note 6, at 38.
58. See G. Catalano Sgrosso, Legal Aspects of the Astronaut in Extravehicular Activ-
ity and the "Space Tourist," Proceedings of the Symposium "Legal and Ethical
Framework for Astronauts in Space Sojourns," Paris, Oct. 29, 2004, co-organized
by ECSL, ESA, IDEST (Institut du droit de 'espace et des t6l6communicatios de
l'Universit6 de Paris XI), UNESCO, doc.SHS-2005/WS22, 57, 59.
59. It may be noted that the cross-waiver which the IGA, see infra note 62, provided
for, while rather comprehensive in many other respects, see infra note 63, did not
extend to "claims between a Partner State and its related entity or between its
own related entities" under Art. 16(3.d), sub (1).
60. This concerned Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., Smith
& Hdrl, supra note 6, at 39.
61. Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America, Govern-
ments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Ja-
pan, and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design,
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renegotiated following the demise of the Soviet Union to allow the
Russian Federation to join, leading to the currently applicable version
of the Intergovernmental Agreement ("IGA") in 1998.62
Logically following from the public character of the IGA, the ques-
tion of any damage sustained in the course of ISS-related activities
was regulated principally at the state-to-state level, though with far-
reaching flow-down provisions to ensure the space agencies, contrac-
tors, and sub-contractors involved under the guidance of the states
would abide by the liability regime as well. That liability regime actu-
ally provided for a quite far-reaching cross-waiver of liability, as be-
tween all the states and their agencies, contractors, sub-contractors,
and anyone else involved in the chain of developing, building, launch-
ing, and operating the space station.63
For understandable reasons, there is no arrangement in the con-
text of ISS activities (or more generally in human spaceflight so far)
for something which might be called "personal" liability. Up to this
time, all persons having entered outer space were astronauts, cosmo-
nauts, or taikonauts, highly-trained employees of governmental space
agencies, whose presence in outer space was primarily or exclusively
for professional reasons. This meant that any issues of such persons
causing damage and raising questions of liability were dealt with in
the context of their professional employment, with any "personal" lia-
bility likely being waived absent gross negligence or disregard of
orders.
In the case of Tito, in spite of the fact that he was not a profes-
sional under contract with the Russian Space Agency or the Russian
government, the result of the ISS regime on liability- its comprehen-
sive mandatory cross-waiver-was that the United States 64 might
Development, Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space
Station, Sept. 29, 1988, in Space Law-Basic Legal Documents, § D.II.4.2 (Karl-
Heinz Bockstiegel & Marietta Benko eds., 1995).
62. Agreement among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of
the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the
Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States of America con-
cerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, Jan. 29, 1998, in
Space Law-Basic Legal Documents, § D.II.4 (Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel & Marietta
Benko eds., 1995) [hereinafter "IGA"].
63. See IGA, supra note 62, art. 16. A limited set of exceptions to the cross-waiver
were provided for, relating to such special cases as wilful misconduct and intellec-
tual property, or concerning claims by natural persons for bodily injury, impair-
ment of health or death; cf. IGA, supra note 62, art. 16(3.d). The cross-waiver
was comprehensively construed also in that the "Protected Space Operations"
and the categories of activities covered by it, were not confined to operations on
board the ISS or relating to its launches or station-keeping, but also included all
sorts of (terrestrial) tests, visits and exchanges; cf. IGA, supra note 62, art.
16(2.f).
64. Of course, the same would apply to any other ISS-partner state, but at that point
in time apart from Russia itself, only the United States had a module in place on
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face a situation where Tito could cause damage to the U.S. module or
U.S. experiments without being able to hold Russia or the Russian
Space Agency liable for such damage.
This possibility was foreshadowed by the IGA only to the extent
that if partner states would bring in a separate state or a private en-
tity under the jurisdiction of such a state, they would require consulta-
tion with and a presumptive consensus of other partner states in order
to do so.6 5 Moreover, states should seek "to avoid causing serious ad-
verse effects on the use of the Space Station by the other Partners
.... "66 At the same time, the IGA also provided that respective part-
ner states would maintain jurisdiction and control over their respec-
tive modules; in other words, it was essentially within the sovereign
discretion of Russia to allow Tito on board its module. 67 More specifi-
cally, partner states have "the right to barter or sell any portion of
their respective allocations ... ."68 The resulting deadlock was solved
by a special ad hoc agreement between the relevant states, which pro-
vided for a prohibition of Tito leaving the Russian module, Russia tak-
ing out liability insurance, and NASA (and the other space agencies)
dropping further resistance against his presence on board the ISS.69
Once NASA realized that bringing tourists to the space station, as
long as properly covered by appropriate legal arrangements, could ac-
tually be a beneficial operation (partly because of the trend towards
allowing partial commercialization of space station activities in order
to help alleviate governmental budget problems), its attitude funda-
mentally changed. 70 As a consequence, the possibility of bringing
non-professionals to the ISS was generalized by means of agreement
among the IGA parties on Principles Regarding Processes and Crite-
ria for Selection, Assignment, Training, and Certification of ISS (Ex-
pedition and Visiting) Crewmembers in January 2002, which
effectively provided for a category of "spaceflight participants" as sep-
arate from "astronauts." Spaceflight participants, defined as "individ-
uals . . . sponsored by one or more partner(s)," explicitly including
the ISS. Moreover, U.S. authorities were most worried about amateur astro-
nauts, read tourists, as they had been faced recently with a tragic accident on a
U.S. submarine with visitors on board, happening to surface precisely under a
Japanese fishing vessel, killing more than a dozen fishermen. Cf. Smith & H6rl,
supra note 6, at 45 n.7; Collins, supra note 29, at 191.
65. See IGA, supra note 62, art. 9(3.a); Andr6 Farand, Commercialization of Interna-
tional Space Station Utilization: The European Partner's Viewpoint, 28 AIR &
SPACE LAw 83, 84 (2003).
66. IGA, supra note 62, art. 9(4).
67. See IGA, supra note 62, art. 5(2).
68. IGA, supra note 62, art. 9(2).
69. See Steven Freeland, Up, Up and... Back: The Emergence of Space Tourism and
Its Impact on the International Law of Outer Space, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3
(2005); Sgrosso, supra note 58, at 59-60.
70. See Freeland, supra note 69, at 2-3.
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tourists, were allowed to be on board the ISS as long as in conformity
with the aforementioned principles.71 It was under this regime that
the subsequent space tourists would visit the ISS.
It should be noted, however, that this development did not in any
sense change the liability situation as dealt with by Article 16 of the
IGA-or for that matter the Liability Convention-as far as interna-
tional third-party liability is concerned.7 2 The cross-waiver continues
to stand, making the state under whose jurisdiction a tourist is going
up (so far, this concerns Russia only) immune from claims under the
IGA for damage caused by such a tourist, whereas at the same time,
that state continues to be liable for international third-party damage,
something to be possibly-but not automatically or necessarily-de-
flected through the particular contract with the "tourist company" in-
volved, obliging it to reimburse the state any relevant international
claim.
VI. LIABILITY ISSUES IN SUB-ORBITAL SPACE TOURISM
Essentially, the revolutionary aspect of the next step in private
spaceflight, sub-orbital space tourism, which is about to take off fol-
lowing the conclusion of the X Prize competition in October 2004, is
that this type of spaceflight not only concerns private tourists, but also
private spacecraft.
A. Applying Air Law or Space Law to Sub-Orbital Space
Tourism?
Sub-orbital space tourism has often been compared to air transport
for reasons of legal analysis and development. In particular, in avia-
tion's "barn storm" era in the early decades of the twentieth century,
aviation was driven by daring private individuals on their own ac-
71. R.P. Veldhuyzen & T.L. Masson-Zwaan, ESA Policy and Impending Legal Frame-
work for Commercial Utilisation of the European Columbus Laboratory Module of
the ISS, in THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION-COMMERCIAL UTILISATION FROM
A EUROPEAN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 47, 54-55 (Frans G. von der Dunk & M.M.T.A.
Brus eds., 2006); Smith & Hrl, supra note 6, at 46 n.24, (making reference to
Article III of the Principles Regarding Processes and Criteria for Selection, As-
signment, Training and Certification of ISS (Expedition and Visiting)
Crewmembers). See, e.g., A. Farand, ISS Cooperation: Recent Developments in
Rule Making, ESA BULLETIN 111 (Eur. Space Agency, Paris, Fr.), Aug. 2002, at
82; Freeland, supra note 69, at 3-4; Farand, supra note 65, at 84-87.
72. See IGA, supra note 62, art. 17(1) (expressly confirming that "except as otherwise
provided in Article 16, the Partner States, as well as ESA, shall remain liable in
accordance with the Liability Convention"). See also A. Farand, Jurisdiction and
Liability Issues in Carrying out Commercial Activities in the International Space
Station (ISS) Programme in THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION-COMMERCIAL
UTILISATION FROM A EUROPEAN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 87, 92-93 (Frans G. von der
Dunk & M.M.T.A. Brus eds., 2006).
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count and risk, trying to develop the most feasible methods for
humans to stay up in the air. Such aviation pioneers were often moti-
vated by prize money offered for certain specific achievements or
records.
From a legal perspective, however, this comparison does not seem
all that appropriate beyond such a comparison with the "barn storm"
era. Rather than transporting any passengers from one place on the
earth's surface to another, the current plans as outlined earlier are
essentially about a simple "up-and-down," a kind of sophisticated (and
rather expensive) form of bungee-jumping. To that extent, compari-
sons with today's high-risk adventure tourism such as canyoning, ex-
treme mountaineering, or survivalling, and the liabilities involved,
are much more on point than comparisons with today's air transport
industry.
It may further be noted that, at least in the case of the X Prize and
Virgin Galactic, being over 100 kilometers in altitude was sold by the
company as "being in outer space." Such a private sales-pitch, of
course, cannot prejudge any international agreement on what consti-
tutes outer space, but unfortunately for the time being, such interna-
tional agreement is missing.73
So, the question remains whether sub-orbital flight occurs in
"outer space" for purposes of international space law and the conse-
quent exercise of national jurisdiction, including regulating liability.
The Outer Space Treaty in this respect provides for "international re-
sponsibility for national activities in outer space," requiring
"authorisation and continuing supervision" of "the appropriate State"
in case these activities are undertaken by private entities. 74 At the
same time, no state is entitled to exercise jurisdiction in outer space
on a territorial basis, since outer space is free from "national
appropriation."75
B. National Law and Sub-orbital Space Tourism
In the case of the United States, among other nations, the afore-
mentioned authorization and continuing supervision has indeed been
taken care of, notably through the licensing regime established under
the Commercial Space Launch Act as most recently amended in
2004.76 This also takes care of the liability, notably through sections
70112 and 70113. These clauses, among other things, establish a
73. See infra Part VII.B.
74. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI.
75. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. II.
76. See Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, Pub, L. No. 108-492,
118 Stat. 3974 (2004) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 70101-70305 (West
2004). The original Commercial Space Launch Act was enacted in 1984. Com-
mercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984).
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mechanism for imposing a cap on the reimbursement obligation rest-
ing upon the licensee, which is calculated using such concepts as
"maximum probable loss," the maximum insurance available against
reasonable rates, and a ceiling of reimbursement for third-party liabil-
ity purposes of $500,000,000 U.S.77 It also obliges the licensee to then
either insure against the maximum of possible reimbursement or
show "financial responsibility" to the same amount.7 8
With a view to Spaceport Sweden, it is noteworthy that Sweden
also has a national space law including a licensing system in place,
albeit a rather succinct one. It does provide, however, for anyone
"launching... objects into outer space and all measures to manoeuvre
or in any other way affect objects launched into outer space" the obli-
gation to obtain a license, including where such a launch takes place
from Swedish soil.79 Furthermore, the licensee will have to fully reim-
burse any claim against the Swedish government as a consequence of
licensed activities entailing Sweden's international third-party liabil-
ity, unless "special reasons tell against this."80 Unlike the U.S. case,
therefore, there is no principled cap on the reimbursement.
Still, as the carrier for the SS-2 spacecraft itself is an aircraft, the
question also arises whether national air law, including its liability
system might also apply. It may be noted in this regard that both
White Knight, the carrier aircraft of the SS-1, and the SS-1 itself
"were registered as experimental aircraft. The SS-1 was adorned with
the FAA registration number N 328 K, where 328 K referred to the
328,000 feet that was the intended altitude for the Ansari X-prize."81
Virgin Galactic, however, aims at having the combination of car-
rier and SS-2 to be formally defined as a spacecraft under authority of
the Office of the Administrator for Space Transportation with the U.S.
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"). Yet, the carrier itself, an
aircraft of Boeing 757-size, is a more or less normal aircraft. Even the
77. See Commercial Space Launch Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 70112(a.3). In short, the lowest
of these three amounts will rule to establish the maximum to the reimbursement
obligation in any particular license, albeit that the U.S. legislators choose to limit
the extent to which the U.S. government would itself accept an obligation to com-
pensate to $1,500,000,000 U.S. over and above the first tier of damage to be reim-
bursed by the licensee. This nevertheless leaves open the question as to what
would happen if the total international third-party liability claim would exceed
even the combined total of reimbursement obligation for the licensee (first tier)
plus U.S. governmental commitment (second tier).
78. Commercial Space Launch Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 70112(a.4).
79. Act on Space Activities, § 1, 1982: 963, Nov. 18, 1982; National Space Legislation
of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 398; Space Law-Basic Legal Documents (Karl-
Heinz Bockstiegel & Marietta Benko eds., 1995), E.II.1; 36 Zeitschrift ffir Luft-
und Weltraumrecht (1987), at 11; see also Sec. 2, Act on Space Activities.
80. Act on Space Activities, § 6.
81. Von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 3. See van Fenema, supra note 15, at 399-400,
407 pt. 3.3. See Freeland, supra note 69, at 2-3.
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SS-2 vehicles, like the SS-1, will operate as a glider in their return
phase and will be registered under N 400 K-400,000 feet being the
intended altitude for SS-2. Finally, the company is aiming to have the
combination certified under the regime applicable to the certification
of aircraft in the United States; albeit it has no intention to go through
all the testing normally required for that purpose.8 2
As a consequence, there might be some questions as to whether air
law liability rules would apply in addition to the space law regime, as
the space law regime is not triggered by the place where damage is
caused (outer space or airspace) but by being caused by a "space ob-
ject" "launched into"-or intended to be launched into-outer space.8 3
In this sense, the carrier aircraft is also to be seen as the "launch vehi-
cle" for the space object proper, at least until separation of SS-2 from
it, thus entailing possible liability under the Liability Convention as
well.8 4
C. Applying the Liability Convention to Sub-orbital Space
Tourism?
As for the application of the Liability Convention to this version of
private spaceflight, it should be pointed out that the potential for the
Convention to become applicable is rather limited, certainly for the
time being, in view of its application to "international" liability issues.
Given the rather straightforward up-and-down character of the opera-
tion, the chance of a carrier aircraft (or even the SS-2) causing damage
outside of U.S. borders (in Mexico) from either California (for launches
from the Mojave desert) or New Mexico (for the future launches from
Spaceport America) is fairly small. Damage caused on U.S. territory
itself could only entail liability under the Liability Convention in case
of foreigners being hurt or damaged who were not "participating in the
launch ...."85
That may soon change, however, in view of the intended Virgin Ga-
lactic operations per 2012 from Kiruna, as the distance from the in-
tended Spaceport Sweden to the borders of Norway and Finland is
82. See von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 3.
83. See Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. I(d). While "space object" has not
been defined in any appreciable detail by the Convention, general opinion would
have it that the element of "launch" is key in determining whether something
qualifies as a space object for the purpose of the Liability Convention and the
other space treaties. Cf B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997),
324-26, 464, 493-95; Hobe & Cloppenburg, supra note 3, at 381.
84. Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. I(d) provides in full: "The term 'space
object' includes component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and
parts thereof." See also Cheng, supra note 83, at 464, 500-01.
85. Cf Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. VII(d), as discussed supra Part IV.
See also Freeland, supra note 69, at 11; van Fenema, supra n. 15, at 400.
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considerably smaller.86 Even more important are the plans of Space
Adventures to build spaceports for similar purposes in the United
Arab Emirates and Singapore, two of the smallest nations in the world
in terms of surface areas.
Finally, as to the international implications of these developments,
it should first be pointed out that the SS-2 flights, as launched from
Spaceport America, will only briefly enter outer space at its edges,
normally staying well out of any potentially conflicting trajectory of
other space objects. Thus, the U.S. actions that are already being un-
dertaken and that are currently anticipated have few international
ramifications. This applies also to the solutions drafted regarding is-
sues as whether and how to license and certify the craft, the opera-
tions, and the crew.
At a later stage, of course, such national U.S. legislative actions,
both justified and made necessary by Virgin Galactic's impending ac-
tivities, may have a considerable bearing on the development of other
nation's actions. U.S. action may also affect international regulation
of the matter, including decisions about national regulation in other
countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Singapore. Even
Sweden, which currently has a national space law in place that is
rather different in its handling of liability issues, intends to essen-
tially follow the U.S. approach on these issues.8 7 The United States'
influence over these issues is evidenced in that the U.S. authorities
have, consciously or unconsciously, interpreted the relevant concepts
that are not well defined at the international level, such as that of
"space object," "launch" (as it would help to define "space object"), "per-
sons participating in the launch," and even "outer space."88
From this angle, while it is both justified and necessary for the
U.S. to deal with liability on the national level (as to both third-party
and contractual liability), as well as the issue of whether waivers or
reimbursements vis-et-vis the U.S. government indeed would be an in-
ternal matter, international ramifications may arise within a few
years. These international issues also concern the question of "license
shopping"-whether other states might be inclined to offer licenses on
easier, less burdensome conditions, in particular on issues of liability.
This may, after all, bring in questions of air law, since in that area at
86. The distance from Spaceport America to the U.S. border with Mexico is some 120
kilometers, whereas Norwegian territory comes as close to Kiruna as some 80
kilometers. More importantly, in view of the rotation of the earth, is the fact that
Mexico lies due south of Spaceport America, whereas Norway lies to the west
through north and Finland to the north through east of Spaceport Sweden, mak-
ing the latter's geographical position considerably more likely to lead to impacts
on foreign territory than is the case with the former.
87. See de Selding & Malik, supra note 24, at 10.
88. See Liability Convention, supra note 38, arts. I(d), VII(b). As for the discussion of
the definition of "outer space," see infra Part VII.B.
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least major efforts have been made to harmonize international liabil-
ity and compensation issues, whereas in terms of high-risk adventure
tourism, there is no international harmonization whatsoever in terms
of liability.8 9
VII. LIABILITY ISSUES IN SUB-ORBITAL
PRIVATE SPACEFLIGHT
With the plans for sub-orbital private spaceflight as briefly dis-
cussed before, another dimension is added as compared to that of pri-
vate sub-orbital tourism; the former concerns private spaceflight
involving private operators, private spacecraft, and private tourists,
and this time with a fundamentally international character and scope.
Actually, two types of operations may be subsumed under this third
type of spaceflight, distinguishing themselves fundamentally from the
previously discussed type in that the place of departure and the place
of arrival are no longer identical. At the same time, it should be noted
that the analysis here will be of a more provisional and general char-
acter in view of the time it will likely take for sub-orbital private
spaceflight to become operational and the consequent lack of current
availability of any further technical, operational, and commercial de-
tails of such operations.
A. Earth-to-Earth, Earth-to-Space, and Space-to-Earth
Transportation and Liability
The first type of operation concerns earth-to-earth transporta-
tion-both of passengers and of cargo, although the costs per trip
likely will not make it worthwhile for some time to transport cargo in
that manner. This is most fundamentally where private spaceflight
becomes most like air transport and partly interferes with it, both in
an operational sense (the first and last stretches of the flight will be in
an airspace where aircraft are bound to fly) and in an economic sense
(this type of private spaceflight would compete with normal air trans-
portation, off-setting greater cost with greater speed of transport).
The distinction with sub-orbital space tourism is not absolute, as
there is certainly a tourism element involved here as well. On the one
hand, just like the air transport industry offers to those primarily in-
terested in the experience of flying cheap trips on available seats
where the destination does not matter, such tourists may-if suffi-
ciently well-to-do-also take a private sub-orbital flight for the sheer
thrill of it. More substantially, on the other hand, tourists will take
these flights just as they may use air transport to get to the ultimate
tourist destination, which, in the case of Virgin Galactic's future oper-
89. For a brief discussion of air law liability, see infra Part VIID.
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ations, may include the additional thrills offered by Spaceport Swe-
den, such as a launch into the Aurora Borealis or a stay in an ice-
hotel.90
The second type of operation concerns earth-to-space and space-to-
earth transportation. Again, this may possibly concern tourists-for
example, going to the future space hotels which form the fourth type of
private spaceflight considered in this article-but may equally possi-
bly concern professional astronauts going to or coming back from the
ISS. This, however, would require proof that the technology is proven
to be both safer and cheaper than existing manned spaceflight. Both
events are fundamentally space transportation-an activity taking
place in outer space for the greater part and of a typically space-ori-
ented character.
In respect of both aviation-like and astronaut types of travel, the
Liability Convention applies in theory and will also, in view of the
damage easily being "international," be relevant in any real-life case
of damage. Thus, the question of harmonization of licensing systems
and how the systems deal with liabilities vis-&-vis privately licensed
operators in order to avoid cheap "flags of convenience" in outer space
is back with redoubled force here. Also in other respects, the applica-
tion of international space law through national law would no longer
be only a national matter, including the definitional issues referred to
earlier.
B. The Boundary Question Revisited: Air Space versus
Outer Space
The last point relates in particular to the boundary question as be-
tween airspace and outer space, in view of the need to apply national
regimes, whether harmonized or not, and whether based on air law or
on space law.91
The problem is that there is no international agreement on where
outer space begins and airspaces end or even a consensus on the need
for a border. The discussion is as old as man's entry into space in
1957, when the orbits of Sputnik I posed the vexing question of how
high traditional sovereignty of states over the airspace above their ter-
ritories92 actually extended. When it was formally and internation-
ally agreed that outer space is a global commons, as per Article II of
the Outer Space Treaty outside the sovereignty of any individual state
90. Cf. de Selding & Malik, supra note 24, at 10.
91. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 83, at 497-98; van Fenema, supra note 15, at 397-98.
92. See Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 1, Apr. 4, 1947, 15 U.N.T.S.
296[hereinafter "Chicago Convention"].
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as a terra communis,9 3 this only reinforced the need to establish a
clear boundary between the two areas subject to regimes with such
fundamental differences.
Then, however, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space ("COPUOS") found it could not establish any consensus on the
boundary question. 94 Some states and experts proposed drawing the
boundary, at least for legal purposes, at varying altitudes, with some
others making a case for a multiple-zone regime. Other states, includ-
ing some of the major space-faring nations (most notably the United
States) considered establishing a boundary premature, in view of pos-
sible later technological developments. Finally, some states adhered
in straightforward fashion to a "functionalist" theory, whereby the
drawing of any borderline was considered to be largely irrelevant and
counterproductive, as air law should simply apply to aircraft (vehicles
essentially involved in transporting passengers and cargo from one
place on earth to another) and space law should apply to space objects
(including those vehicles essentially conducting space exploration or
other space activities).
While the question remained a theoretical one for a long time, from
time to time it raised its head. For instance, in 1976 some equatorial
countries tried to claim parts of the geo-stationary orbit, as the orbit
over the equator at an altitude of some 35,800 kilometers was of spe-
cial interest for telecommunications. These equatorial countries
claimed that such spaces which were "above" their respective territo-
ries were subject to their respective sovereignty.9 5 The appearance of
the space shuttle in 1981, functioning partly as a space object, partly
as an aircraft, again raised the issue of the space border, although the
decision of the U.S. authorities to register the shuttle as a space object
with the U.N. Secretary-General under the Registration Conven-
93. See Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962 XVII, IT 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/575/Rev.1 (Dec. 13, 1963); Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I.
94. For a more extended account of the "legal history" of the discussions concerned,
see, e.g., Frans G. von der Dunk, The sky is the limit - but where does it end? New
Developments On the Issue of Delimitation of Outer Space, 2005 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FORTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 84, 85-90.
95. This was the famous Bogota Declaration of Dec. 3, 1976, EL ESPECTADOR, Dec. 7,
1976, at 13A translated in 6 SPACE L. 193, at 194 para. 2 (1978). The result was,
inter alia, a claim by the equatorial countries that any "[dievices to be placed in a
fixed position on an equatorial [s]tate's segment of the geostationary orbit shall
require previous and expressed authorization on the part of the [sitate concerned
.... " as if such a device equated with an aircraft traversing sovereign national
airspace. Id. at 195, 3(d); see, e.g., Freeland, supra note 3, at 187 n.17.
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tion 96 -rather than as an aircraft under the Chicago Convention-
settled the matter in that case. 97
However, in spite of several concrete proposals to establish a
boundary, it has never been achieved at an international level.98
Hence, interpretations at the national level, made by the United
States as well as by other states confronted with the need to delineate
the scope of their sovereign jurisdiction upward, become important.
In this respect, a number of relevant developments may be noted.
First, in 1995, the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS addressed a
questionnaire to its member states on the issue of "aerospace planes,"
a conceptual vehicle, in a sense a follow-up to the space shuttle, that
would enjoy double functionality (in terms of aviation, respectively
space activities) and hybrid operating capacity (that is both as an air-
craft and as a spacecraft).99 This questionnaire resulted in some in-
teresting answers. Pakistan referred to "altitudes lower than between
90 and 100 km" as essentially constituting air space,lOO Russia
claimed an "international practice ... [was] evolving, [whereby] State
... sovereignty [did] not extend to the space located above the orbit of
least perigee of an artificial Earth satellite (approximately 100 km
above sea level),"1o1 and Germany equated entry below a 100 kilome-
ter altitude to "re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere."l02
96. See generally Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
arts. II, III, IV, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter "Re-
gistration Convention"].
97. Cf. Chicago Convention, supra note 92, art. 17.
98. E.g. van Fenema, supra note 15, at 397-98.
99. COPUS, Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace Ob-
jects, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/1995/CRP.3, based on a Russian Federation work-
ing paper Questions Concerning the Legal Regime for Aerospace Objects, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/ L.189 (Mar. 30, 1992) presented to the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the Work of
its Thirty-First Session, U.N. Doc A/AC.105/514 (Apr. 20, 1992).
100. COPUS, Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace Ob-
jects: Replies From Member States, p. 6, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/635 (Jan. 15, 1996); The Secretariat, Note entitled Comprehensive
Analysis of the Replies to the Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard
to Aerospace Objects, U.N. Doc. A/AC/105/C.2/L.204 delivered at the Thirty-Sixth
Session of the Legal Subcommittee, U.N. Doc A/AC.105/674 (Apr. 14, 1997).
101. The Secretariat, Note entitled Comprehensive Analysis of the Replies to the Ques-
tionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace Objects, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/C.2/L.204 delivered at the Thirty-Sixth Session of the Legal Subcommit-
tee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/674 (Apr. 14, 1997); Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace
Objects: Replies From Member States, p. 6, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 1996). It may also be noted that the
Russian Federation had earlier tabled several proposals for determining an alti-
tude at which outer space was supposed to begin, usually referring to altitudes of
100-110 kilometers.
102. A/AC.105/635, supra note 100, at 4-5.
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More forcefully, the South African national space act provided for a
definition of "outer space" as "the space above the surface of the earth
from a height at which it is in practice possible to operate an object in
an orbit around the earth," which under current practice and possibili-
ties refers to an area above 100 kilometers in altitude.10 3 Even more
forcefully-and recently-Australia amended its 1998 space act in
2002, redefining "launch," "return," and "space object" by replacing the
reference to "outer space" with the phrase "an area beyond the dis-
tance of 100 km above mean sea level."1o4 Apparently, also the Isle of
Man's Treasury Regulations have used the same "demarcation point"
to define "space object."1o 5
Then, it is interesting to note that, while the United States itself
has indicated wishes to refrain from determining any borderline be-
tween air space and outer space (at least for the time being), the FAA
has accorded astronaut's wings to anyone flying above 62.5 miles alti-
tude, an awkward figure in itself, translating however into 100 kilo-
meters. 10 6 This last figure is also the boundary between air space and
outer space as far as the Fidration Agronautique Internationale
("FAI"), the global world aviation sporting events organization, is con-
cerned. l0 7 And at least one U.S. state, Virginia, contemplated legisla-
tion using the same altitude to define outer space. 0 8 An even more
relevant state, New Mexico, maintains an upper limit of the area
under which it will exercise its jurisdiction in tax matters of 60,000
feet, which translates into only approximately eighteen kilometers.10 9
103. Sec. 1, 15 indent, Space Affairs Act, Sept. 6, 1993, assented to on June 23, 1993,
No. 84 of 1993; Statutes of the Republic of South Africa - Trade and Industry,
Issue No. 27, 21-44; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. 1 (2001), at 413.
104. Sec. 8, An act about space activities, and for related purposes, No. 123 of 1998,
assented to Dec. 21, 1998; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. 1 (2001),
at 197; as amended by Act No. 100 of 2002. See, e.g., van Fenema, supra note 15,
at 398; Freeland, supra note 3, at 187 n.18.
105. Freeland, supra note 3, at 187 n.18.
106. See Launius & Jenkins, supra note 4, at 279 n. 63. By contrast, the U.S. Navy
and NASA have routinely handed astronaut wings to those having achieved alti-
tudes of 50 miles and over, as confirmed by private e-mails from R. M. Bresnik,
Attorney-Adviser at NASA's Legal Office (Mar. 19 & 22, 2007) (on file with
author).
107. See Launius & Jenkins, supra note 4, at 279 n.63.
108. Space Flight Liability and Immunity Act, H.D. 3184, 2007 Sess., Art. 24 § 8.01-
227.8 (Va. 2007) defines "spaceflight activities" by means of a one-on-one refer-
ence to suborbital flights and then defines "suborbital" to mean "a distance at or
above 62.5 miles from the Earth's mean sea level." This bill was subsequently
amended and not enacted with the above definition, but instead refers to a defini-
tion provided by the United States Code.
109. New Mexico defined space as "any location beyond altitudes of sixty thousand
feet above the earth's mean sea level" in the Gross Receipts and Compensating
Tax Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-54.2 (LexisNexis 2005); following an e-mail from
L. Montgomery, Senior Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel of the FAA (Mar. 6,
2007) (on file with author).
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Finally, some evidence that a trend may be converging on a borderline
at 100 kilometers was referred to by a recent Study of the Interna-
tional Academy of Astronautics ("IAA"), which makes reference to 100
kilometer altitude as the point of re-entry into a national airspace.11o
In sum, a slow and haphazard consensus may be gradually arising
that until specific developments would make such a consensus unten-
able once more, an altitude at 100 kilometers would be an appropriate
altitude at which to separate the legally distinct areas of airspace and
outer space, at least for those sets of rules that did not specifically
focus on aircraft as opposed to spacecraft-or air transport functions
as opposed to outer space-focused activities.
Such a vertical limitation to the extent in which individual states
would be entitled to exercise their sovereign jurisdiction, for example
for the purpose of applying national regimes on liability, was not of
major importance in the case of "sub-orbital tourism," as this only
briefly and marginally involves outer space, with the vehicle ever so
quickly returning into the same airspace from which it jumped out.
Obviously, with "sub-orbital spaceflight," this is totally different-
the craft will be flying in outer space for an extended part of the tra-
jectory and, almost by definition, will be returning into the atmos-
phere in a different state's national airspace (if performing earth-to-
earth transportation) or even find its destination in outer space (if per-
forming earth-to-space transportation).
C. Traffic Management in Outer Space with a View to
Liability
Thus, the uncertainty about the proper borderline between areas
subject to an individual state's sovereignty (airspaces) and an area
where such sovereignty fundamentally does not apply (outer space)
has also fueled uncertainty as to how to handle future "space traffic"
in terms of management and, in particular, the safety-focused aspect
of traffic control. While many authors logically look to the ICAO for
arranging for a workable system for the management of traffic in
outer space, in view of both its inherent similarities to air traffic man-
agement and its factual interference with air traffic (spacecraft can
only reach outer space through airspace and need to return to earth
through airspace),"' the "how" thereof requires close evaluation and
analysis of the existing situation with a view to dealing with liabilities
for damage caused partly or wholly by erroneous or absent traffic
information.
110. See COSMIC STUDY ON SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT, INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ASTRONAUTICS, 39 (Corrine Contant-Jorgenson et al. eds., 2006).
111. See COSMIC STUDY ON SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 110, for an ex-
tended analysis of the consequences thereof for the need to establish a proper
traffic management regime.
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First, the ICAO has not yet been given the authority of guiding or
arranging the process of establishing a proper traffic management
system in the area of outer space. The closest analogy here is the es-
tablished authority of the ICAO to deal at the highest level with traffic
management issues in the airspaces over the high seas under the Chi-
cago Convention. However, this still requires explicit "appointment"
of one state actually being authorized to, as well as made correspond-
ingly responsible for, the safety of aviation in a particular Flight Infor-
mation Region ("FIR") over the high seas, with the general consent of
the other ICAO member states. 112
If the ICAO is to fulfill the same task in outer space, it would seem
that a similar clause in the Chicago Convention would be necessary
with respect to that area, which will likely raise-much more than
with the airspace over the high seas-issues of political sensitivity (in
view, for example, of the many military uses of outer space) as well as
of how to carve up outer space into feasible FIR's. Whereas FIR's over
the high seas essentially can still be viewed as being of two-dimen-
sional character, the altitude at which an FIR would find its vertical
limit so far never having been an issue, and moreover being by defini-
tion not "above" any state's sovereign territory; in outer space, all this
is fundamentally different.
Second, following the ICAO model would still mean that the appro-
priate organization of an individual state would be mandated to pro-
vide traffic management services. Only in some limited instances in
Europe, an international organization ("Eurocontrol") has been man-
dated to actually provide air traffic services itself.113 A state provid-
ing air traffic services would also be internationally responsible for
it114-but not automatically liable-since in many cases sovereign im-
munities of air traffic service providers, which are still governmental
entities, have precluded any fundamental agreement on liability of air
traffic service providers.115
112. See van Fenema, supra note 15, at 401. This system was developed on the basis
of the Chicago Convention, supra note 92, arts. 12, 37(c), 44(a), (f), (h), Chicago
Convention.
113. Eurocontrol was established in its original version by means of the Convention
Relating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air Navigation, Dec. 30, 1960, 523
U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter "Eurocontrol Convention"]. It is currently being funda-
mentally revised. Cf. Protocol Consolidating the Eurocontrol International Con-
vention Relating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air Navigation, June 27, 1997,
Cm 5587, not yet entered into force; Eurocontrol Revised Convention, Sept. 1997
ed. at Eurocontrol.
114. By analogy to Chicago Convention, supra note 92, art. 28, the responsibility of a
state providing air traffic services in an FIR would apply also in the special case
of the provision of such services over the high seas.
115. See Francis P. Schubert, An International Convention on GNSS Liability: When
Does Desirable Become Necessary?, 24 ANNALS OF AR AND SPACE LAw 245,
258-59, 262-63 (1999).
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As discussions in the context of the use of Global Navigation Satel-
lite Systems ("GNSS") for air traffic services have shown, states are
generally reluctant to accept a foreign state providing such services
when such a state did not accept liability on the international level.116
For example, in the case of the U.S. global positioning system ("GPS"),
the possibility to claim compensation from relevant U.S. authorities
for damage caused by flaws or the absence of GPS signals at critical
moments is limited to claims before U.S. courts in a private capacity,
as allowed by a few U.S. statutes essentially lifting sovereign immu-
nity for that purpose. 1 17
D. The Key Elements of Air Law Liability Regime
The analysis so far has already made considerable reference to the
situation in aviation, and, as indicated before, this will be even more
the case when turning to the liability issues. Starting from the van-
tage point of third-party liability, air law shows a rather fragmented
international picture when compared with the Liability Convention,
as the latter includes almost all states, important from the perspective
of launch capabilities, as these are key to allocating liability.
An international convention does exist relating to on third-party
liability for damage caused by aircraft, essentially on the ground,
which is the Rome Convention of 1952.118 In spite of a later update
raising the limits of compensation for relevant cases of damage by
means of the Montreal Protocol of 1978,119 the Rome Convention both
in its original and in its amended versions has received relatively few
ratifications and was not signed by most of the important aviation
states. This was primarily the result of disagreement on the limits of
compensation, which were considered woefully inadequate by many of
those states. 1 20 The result was, that in many cases of aviation acci-
116. See, e.g., Schubert, supra note 115, at 248-58, 264-67; Frans G. von der Dunk,
Liability for Global Navigation Satellite Services: A Comparative Analysis of GPS
and Galileo, 30 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW 129, 131, 140-43 (2004).
117. This concerns such acts as the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004), the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 App. U.S.C. §§ 741-752
(2000), the Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), and the
Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see Jonathan M.
Epstein, Global Positioning System (GPS): Defining the Legal Issues of its Ex-
panding Civil Use, 61 J. AIR L. & COMMERCE 243, 262-68 (1995).
118. Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Sur-
face, Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181, ICAO Doc. 7364 [hereinafter "Rome
Convention"].
119. Protocol to Amend the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to
Third Parties on the Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, ICAO Doc. 9257 [hereinafter "Mon-
treal Protocol"].
120. See, e.g., I.H.PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW, 148-50,
(7th ed. 2001) (referring to a number of 45 ratifications for the Rome Convention
by January 2001); James Brittom, Roads from Montreal do not Lead to Rome:
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dents causing damage on the ground, national tort law applies with-
out further ado, resulting in a large variety of principles, rules, and, in
particular, limits of compensation being applicable.121
As for contractual ("inter-party") liability, regarding passengers
and the consignors of cargo, early efforts to harmonize national re-
gimes resulted in an international convention, the Warsaw Conven-
tion of 1929.122 This convention, known for its limit to compensation
per passenger of some $10,000 U.S. has been repeatedly amended and
updated, by such documents as the Hague Protocol,123 which, among
other things, raised the limit of compensation to some $20,000 U.S.;
the Guadalajara Convention,124 essentially applying the Warsaw re-
gime to non-scheduled, charter carriers; the Guatemala City Proto-
col,125 which raised the limits to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights
(SDR 100,000); and a set of Montreal Protocols.12 6
Most recently, the 1999 Montreal Convention12 7 presented an ef-
fort to completely overhaul the Warsaw system, which had resulted in
a complicated maze of applicable regimes in any concrete situation in
Criticism and Alternatives to the Draft Convention on Third Party Liability, 30
AIR & SPACE LAW 269, 269 n.1 (2005) (mentioning a decrease to 44 states parties).
121. See Carel J.J.M. Stolker & David I. Levine, Compensation for Damage to Parties
on the Ground as a Result of Aviation Accidents, 22 AIR & SPACE LAW 2, 60-69
(1997).
122. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter "Warsaw Conven-
tion"]. For an extended overview of the Warsaw system as it developed from the
Warsaw Convention, see Thomas J. Whalen, The New Warsaw Convention: The
Montreal Convention, 25 AIR & SPACE LAW 12, 12-26 (2000).
123. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Transportation by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [herein-
after "Hague Protocol"].
124. Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person other
than the Contracting Carrier, Sept. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter "Gua-
dalajara Convention"].
125. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules RELATING
TO INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR, MAR. 8, 1971, ICAO Doc. 8932 [hereinafter
"GUATEMALA CITY PROTOCOL"].
126. Additional Protocol No. 1 TO AMEND THE CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF
CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE By AIR, SEPT. 25, 1975,
U.K.T.S. 1997 No. 75 (CMND. 6480), ICAO Doc. 9145; Additional Protocol No. 2
TO AMEND THE CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR, SEPT. 25, 1975, U.K.T.S. 1997 No. 76 (Cmnd.
6481), ICAO Doc. 9146; Additional Protocol No. 3 TO AMEND THE CONVENTION
FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE
BY AIR, SEPT. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9147; AND MONTREAL PROTOCOL No. 4 TO
AMEND THE CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR, SEPT. 25, 1975, U.K.T.S. 1999 No. 28 (CMND.
6483), ICAO Doc. 9148 [hereinafter "MONTREAL PROTOCOL 4"].
127. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air,
May 28, 1999, ICAO Doc. 9470 [hereinafter "Montreal Convention"].
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view of the different versions of the regime which individual states
had become party to, most prominently by doing away with the limita-
tions to liability compensation in most instances and by inserting a
fifth jurisdiction in which to claim liability.
While the ratification of the Montreal Convention proceeds at a
promising pace and does include most of the major aviation states,
only a near-comprehensive ratification would restore a kind of global
harmonization of applicable rules for which the Convention aims.128
Moreover, even the Montreal Convention leaves considerable leeway
to national jurisdictions, which might still result in considerable dif-
ferences from state to state as to the implementation and interpreta-
tion of the Convention's regime.
E. Applying the Air Liability Regime to Sub-orbital Private
Spaceflight
As both the third-party and the contractual liability conventions
outlined above fundamentally address aviation, the key questions are
(1) whether they do, or possibly would, apply; and (2) whether they
should apply. The answer to these questions hinges upon two defini-
tional issues.
First, the conventions are all applicable in some manner to the
flight of aircraft-whether crashing on earth so as to damage third-
party victims, or suffering any sort of accident damaging passengers
or cargo on board. None of the conventions referred to above define
aircraft, but all would essentially be bound by the general definition of
aircraft as it has been developed in the context of the Chicago Conven-
tion, which also is very much focused on aircraft in terms of applicabil-
ity of its regime and that of the Standards and Recommended
Practices ("SARP's")129 developed under it.
This generally accepted ICAO definition in its 1967-version pro-
vides: "Aircraft is any machine that can derive support in the atmos-
phere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air
against the earth's surface." 130 In particular the references to "atmos-
phere" and "air" indicate that at some altitude, in the absence of such
physical matter, aircraft by definition cannot fly, which is where in
128. Cf. Hobe & Cloppenburg, supra note 3, at 378.
129. Under the Chicago Convention, supra note 92, arts. 37 & 38, the Annexes con-
taining SARP's providing relevant technical, operational, and other details on
specific issues addressed by the Chicago Convention constitute an integral part of
the regime developed under that Convention, with the Standards included being
by definition binding.
130. Revised and amended text of Annex 7 to the Chicago Convention, Nov. 6, 1967,
ICAO Doc. No. 9294, Vol. 11. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 120, at 5;
L.B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK 11
(2000) (on the specific application in the context of the Warsaw Convention);
Hobe & Cloppenburg, supra note 3; van Fenema, supra note 15, 400-01.
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practical terms rocket-mode propulsion has to take over. On the other
hand, a craft which has hybrid propulsion allowing it to fly both in the
air and in outer space could still be considered aircraft, since it still
constitutes a "machine" which "can derive support from the air," even
if it does not do so for all or even the major parts of its flight.
From a theoretical perspective, certainly some of the contemplated
private spaceflight vehicles and parts thereof (such as the White
Knight in case of SS-1) would qualify, but some others certianly would
not. Moreover, on the national level (at least under the U.S. approach
to sub-orbital space tourism so far) the activities and vehicles con-
cerned were considered to be rather sui generis, causing a special re-
gime to be provided for the time being which completely ignores both
the third-party and the contractual liability systems of aviation cur-
rently applicable. This may change, that special regime being ex-
pressly determined to be of interim character. Moreover, obviously
the definition of aircraft referred to is not unequivocally applicable to
all sub-orbital private spaceflight, and at least a clarification exercise,
preferably at the international level in view of the growing implication
of other states than only the United States in the field, would seem
necessary in order to dispel any doubts on this issue. This then raises
the question of desirability of applying such a regime.
Here, it is submitted that in general it would be logical and appro-
priate to indeed start working on making the above liability system
for aviation applicable without doubt to sub-orbital private spaceflight
at least for contractual liability, once such flights are being offered by
providers on a more or less routine basis, with the exception of passen-
gers going to or coming back from a place of destination in outer space,
notably to space hotels such as to be dealt with later.1 3 1
For third-party liability, further discussion might be necessary, for
example, based on the extent to which aircraft-modes and rocket-
modes of propulsion would be used in alternation, on which regime
should be applied here. From the present perspective, the Liability
Convention has a clear advantage over the air law-regime, since the
latter, as indicated, exhibits a rather unsatisfactory lack of interna-
tional coherence. Further, the limits included in the Rome Conven-
tion and Montreal Protocol in themselves would not be considered
appropriate. On the other hand, the Rome Convention/Montreal Pro-
tocol/national tort law system has the benefit of leading to binding
court decisions.1 32 Conceivably, the two systems could be left in exis-
tence side-by-side, allowing cases where the vehicle in question can be
defined as a space object in conformity with the Liability Convention
to be dealt with under that Convention, if the states entitled to claim
131. See infra Part VIII.
132. See Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. XIX(2).
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under that Convention would so be inclined, as this does not take
away the potential of individual claimants to assert claims in a pri-
vate capacity in a national court of a potentially involved state.13 3
The second definition that becomes important is the scope of activi-
ties once the applicability of the conventions on the basis of the char-
acterization of the vehicle as an aircraft is achieved. As the
conventions focus on harmonization of national laws on the issue, they
basically deal with international aspects of aviation, leaving it to na-
tional sovereign discretion whether to apply the relevant regime also
to national air transport.
In this respect, the Chicago Convention already defines an "inter-
national air service" as "an air service which passes through the air
space over the territory of more than one State."134 As a consequence,
for the general purposes of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes, and
any further air law or regulation following from it, any private craft
performing sub-orbital space tourism (the third category of private
spaceflight considered here) would easily be subsumed under this defi-
nition once it can be defined as an "aircraft" following the above defini-
tion-"air service" is defined as "any scheduled air service performed
by aircraft for the public transport of passengers, mail or cargo." 13 5
As for third-party liability, however, the Rome Convention applies
to "damage . . .caused in the territory of a Contracting State by an
aircraft registered in the territory of another Contracting State." In
other words, it is the (foreign) registration which determines its appli-
cation, rather than its involvement in any international flight. Thus,
once a vehicle would come to be defined as an "aircraft," its registra-
tion as such would immediately allow the Rome Convention to become
applicable (of course once properly ratified by the state concerned).
The Montreal Protocol interestingly broadens the scope to include air-
craft "whatever its registration may be, the operator of which has his
133. Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. XI(2), refers only to the courts of launch-
ing state(s) as venues for claims allowable regardless of an international claim
being pursued under the Liability Convention. In case the defendant under
Rome Convention/Montreal Protocol/national tort law is an operator from a state
which does not qualify as a launching state, the Liability Convention would not
seem to exclude the claimant going to another state to instigate private proceed-
ings against the defendant, as the clause under consideration only determines
the state(s) where claims can be asserted, not against whom they could be as-
serted. Of course, this might not be a very attractive option since the launching
state's court may decline jurisdiction over a claim against a defendant from an-
other state, especially if the claimant is not from that same launching state. Fur-
thermore, it obviously requires definition of the vehicle to be a "space object" in
order to trigger any potential applicability of the Liability Convention, which in
turn, as discussed supra text accompanying note 88, also depends on its being
"launched" in a normal sense of the word.
134. Chicago Convention, supra note 92, art. 96(b).
135. Chicago Convention, supra note 92, art. 96(a).
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principal place of business or ... his permanent residence in another
[clontracting [s]tate." But, once more, any private craft used for
spaceflight qualifying as an aircraft would be easily subsumed regard-
less of the international character of the flight.136
Finally, as to contractual liability, the Warsaw Convention applies
to "international carriage," defined as "any carriage in which . . . the
place of departure and the place of destination.., are situated either
within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stop-
ping place within [the] territory" of another state, even if that state is
not a High Contracting Party.137 This would indeed apply to sub-orbi-
tal private spaceflight, as long as it is of the earth-to-earth character;
if the transportation is earth-to-space or space-to-earth, as the desti-
nation in space by definition would not be "within the territory of a
state," it would not fall within the scope of the Warsaw Convention at
least as of yet.138
The Hague Convention offered essentially the same definition for
"carriage."139 Neither the Guatemala City Protocol, nor Montreal
Protocol No. 4 (which is the relevant one here), nor the Guadalajara
Convention, amended the latter version. 140 The Montreal Convention
of 1999, finally, in relevant parts exactly copies the same provisions of
Article I of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague
Protocol. 141
Consequently, for earth-to-earth private suborbital spaceflight, the
international third-party liability regime of the Rome Convention/
Montreal Protocol could easily be made applicable-a conclusion ap-
plicable to earth-to-space and space-to-earth transportation in a simi-
lar fashion. The contractual liability regime, from Warsaw
Convention to Montreal Convention, would itself be applicable already
now to the extent the craft involved would be, or could be, defined as
"aircraft" in the sense of the ICAO definition provided before. It is
therefore essentially the uncertainty remaining as a consequence of
various types of vehicles and constructs envisaged, the potential "dual
136. Montreal Protocol, supra note 119, art. XII.
137. Warsaw Convention, supra note 122, art. 1(1) & (2). For an extended analysis of
this phrase, see GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 130, at 14-19.
138. Hobe & Cloppenburg, supra, n. 3, at 379, argue that a "place of destination," qual-
ifying relevant flights for falling within the scope of the contractual liability re-
gime, "is not necessarily a place on the ground," but their analysis rightly limits
itself to "places of destination" in an airspace for the purpose of air-launching a
vehicle (such as the SS-1) and such airspace is legally to be seen as part of the
territory of a state; cf. Chicago Convention, supra note 92, art. 1.
139. See Hague Protocol, supra note 123, art. I.
140. Cf. Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 125, art. I; Montreal Protocol 4, supra
note 126, art. I; Guadalajara Convention, supra note 124, art. II.
141. See Montreal Convention, supra note 127, art. 1(1) & (2).
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use" of one flight for earth-to-earth, earth-to-space and space-to-earth
transportation at the same time, and the applicability of space law,
including its liability regime-which will not go away merely because
of any applicability of the air law liability regime-which warrants
further discussion on the proper way to go forward in this respect. 14 2
VIII. LIABILITY ISSUES WITH REGARD
TO HOTELS IN ORBIT
To a large extent, the subject of liability in regard to hotels in orbit
includes issues which go beyond the proper scope of this article. This
concerns what, in many respects, is the essence of running a hotel,
that is, service to be provided to the guests and any damage suffered
by them during their stay on a hotel. These issues would, or at least
might, well apply also to the rather special (and future) category of
hotels in orbit, but are not dealt with here.
At the same time, a hotel in orbit is clearly a quite special category,
and, different from terrestrial hotels, is permanently moving relative
to earth. As such, a hotel most certainly constitutes a "space object" in
the sense relevant for the application of the space treaties, including
the Liability Convention.143 Thus, the space law liability regime, and
how it applies to this specific context clearly warrants attention.
Similarly, under the Outer Space Treaty, the state as whose na-
tional activities the space hotel operations should be qualified will be
held responsible for any violation of relevant space law rules by activi-
ties emanating from the hotel and will have to authorize and continu-
ously supervise at least the operation of the hotel itself.'4 4 This,
preferably under such a regime that also governs guests' individual
activities, may equally lead to the international responsibility of the
state concerned.
Due to a lack of concrete plans, no specific analysis can be offered
yet, but at present, three aspects seem to require further investiga-
tion, including the private character of the hotels in orbit, the private
nature of the guests, and docking activities.
A. The Private Character of Hotels in Orbit
Upon examination of the inclusion of hotels in orbit in the scope of
the liability regime as provided by the Liability Convention, the third-
party liability regime provided by the Convention first raises the issue
of the private character of the operator of the space hotel. This issue
142. Cf. Stefan Kaiser & Martha Mejia-Kaiser, Space Passenger Liability, 2005 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 207,
210-12; Hobe & Cloppenburg, supra note 3, at 382-83.
143. See Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. I(d) (as discussed supra note 84).
144. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI.
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has been discussed in more general terms above,14 5 but the quasi-per-
manent character of hotels in orbit-they would likely be intended to
be operational at least for a number of years, if not decades, as op-
posed to short travels-causes a special situation to arise in practice.
This characteristic of the present form of "private spaceflight"
means that the states possibly held liable for damage caused by any
activities on a hotel in orbit are, much more than with regard to a
"simple" short duration flight, induced to exercise jurisdiction on
board these space hotels both by the licensing process and, perhaps,
by actual monitoring activities at regular intervals. In other words,
the issue of which state is entitled to exercise jurisdiction is of much
greater importance for hotels in orbit than it is for short duration
flights. Moreover, this should not only concern normal responsibilities
and liabilities for operators of a transport activity, but also such
things as criminal law and intellectual property rights law.
Suffice it to point out at this stage that the Outer Space Treaty,
jointly with the Registration Convention, determines the process. It is
the state of registration, which is entitled to "retain jurisdiction and
control."146 The practice of states to, wherever considered necessary
or desirable, extend the scope of specific national legislation to space
objects duly registered by means of a specific act confirms that this
clause of the Outer Space Treaty does not result in automatic applica-
tion of all national legislation to such space object. The state entitled
to register is the launching state, in the case that only one state quali-
fies to do so. If there is more than one state qualifying as the launch-
ing state in regard to a space object, they must decide among
themselves which of them would register, which, as mentioned, gains
considerable relevance in the case of hotels in orbit.147
B. The Private Character of Guests in Orbit
The private character of the guests should, likewise, be taken into
consideration. As described above, there is a desire for states to exer-
cise jurisdiction over hotels in orbit in terms of both regular liabilities
and also in terms of criminal law, for example, largely because guests
on the hotel would principally not be trained professionals, but paying
amateurs.
In addition, the question arises regarding the applicability of the
Liability Convention in case the guest-supposedly not coming from
the launching state of the hotel in orbit itself-could be directly held
to have caused relevant damage. A guest is not a "space object," so if a
145. See supra Part IV.A.
146. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII.
147. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII; Registration Convention, supra
note 96, arts. I(a) & (c), 11(1) & (2).
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guest is the cause of relevant damage, the Liability Convention would
not seem to be applicable since such application is triggered funda-
mentally by a space object causing damage.
In other words, if such a guest would cause the hotel in orbit, for
example, to change orbit and damage another spacecraft, it will still
be the launching state of the hotel, not of the hotel guest, which would
be held liable-unless one were to argue that the launching state of
the space vehicle bringing the guest to the hotel (such space vehicle
clearly being a space object in the sense of the Liability Convention)
would lead to a chain of causation ("space object"--)"hotel
guest"--"presence of guest in hotel"--)"guest causing hotel to cause
damage") strong enough to arrive at a determination of liability for the
latter launching state, but this seems a rather far-fetched argument.
It does show, however, that solid arrangements should one way or an-
other try to exclude as much uncertainty as possible regarding where
liabilities may come to reside in relevant cases.
C. A Special Case: Docking Activities
A special case is presented where spacecraft, whether private or
not, dock with the space hotel. The result is a situation where two
different types of space objects conduct a rendez vous: one, a transport
vehicle, and the other, a more permanent part of infrastructure.
Such dockings would potentially lead to damage. Both being space
objects, the relevant provisions of the Liability Convention provide for
fault liability in case of damage. 148 With two space objects intention-
ally docking, yet being of such different character, fault may be diffi-
cult to establish, however, and the operator of the hotel should not
automatically proceed on the assumption that the docking spaceship,
the more active and maneuverable of the two, should be held liable. In
any case, proper protocols and standard procedures would have to be
developed which include clear indications regarding potential liability
situations.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is clear that private spaceflight poses great challenges to public
space law. In many respects, these challenges are greater than the
current ability of national space law to address them. For instance,
intricate liability issues arise when private operators are transporting
or hosting private passengers (i.e., when no state actor is directly in-
volved). Here, both aviation and high-risk adventure tourism may of-
fer interesting precedents to make up for the inherent limitations of
the Liability Convention in this field, which are due to the Liability
148. See Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. III.
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Convention's state-oriented character and its exclusive focus on third-
party liability and lack of automatically binding dispute settlement
procedures.
National law, with its broad experience with contractual liabilities
and judicial systems, would offer the appropriate mechanisms to deal
with those issues, at least for the time being. For a number of rea-
sons, the United States has taken the lead in this respect. However,
in the long run, this does not seem very satisfactory, and the inherent
international character of all space activities, including all forms of
private spaceflight, may require going beyond national solutions in or-
der to prevent, for example, flags of convenience from appearing in the
skies. Only in such a way, it seems, would private spaceflight be able
to contribute to the fundamental rule of Article I of the Outer Space
Treaty, that "the exploration and use of outer space ... shall be car-
ried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries," by lower-
ing the costs of access to outer space in a revolutionary, yet balanced,
way on an irreversible basis.
